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Cooperative wineries have always produced mostly low-quality wine. 
Since they began to receive abundant state subsidies in the period 
following the Second World War, they have produced a substantial part 
of all European wine, but prior to that their market share was low. This 
paper discusses whether both the specialisation of the first Spanish 
cooperative wineries in the production of ordinary wine and its poor 
market penetration were a result of their inability to prevent members 
from carrying out opportunistic behaviours. It contends that cooperative 
wineries were in fact capable of fighting opportunism and that producing 
ordinary wine was the best option for the vast majority of them, even 
though they did not manage to offer winegrowers advantages that were 
significant enough to offset the inconveniences of being members. 
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Cooperative wineries emerged at the end of the nineteenth century and throughout the 
first half of the twentieth century their market share was low in all countries. From 
around 1950, however, the intervention of the state made it easier for them to begin to 
gain followers among both small and large European winegrowers. Paradoxically, this 
has been compatible with the fact that cooperative wineries have always had a poor 
reputation among wine consumers, who associate them with ordinary wine. Indeed, they 
have always produced mainly cheap, low quality wine. This paper uses information 
from Spain, accompanied by numerous references to France, with a twofold aim: to 
analyse why the early cooperative wineries specialised in the production of table wine 
(an expression that will henceforth be used as a synonym for low quality wine) and to 
investigate why wine cooperatives took so long to become strong. 
The expansion that began in the 1950s meant that in the early twenty-first 
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century cooperative wineries in the European Union had 550,000 members.1 By then, 
cooperatives in the world’s three largest wine producers, France, Italy and Spain, were 
producing 52, 55 and 70 per cent of the wine in their countries.2 In contrast, in the mid-
1930s there were just over 100 cooperative wineries in Spain and Italy, with a market 
share of less than 5 per cent. In France, where the government support they had been 
receiving since 1906 intensified in the 1930s, there were more (503 in 1932 and 838 in 
1939), but French cooperatives’ achievements in terms of market share were not 
particularly brilliant either: less than 10 per cent in 1932 and less than 20 per cent in 
1939.3 
Thanks to Eva Fernández and James Simpson, we have a solid explanation of 
why wine cooperation became widespread in Europe after the Second World War. As in 
France in the 1930s, but now in a more generalised fashion, governments wanted to use 
cooperatives to regulate markets and, to enable them to store large volumes of wine and 
distil it in times of over-production, they were offered low-interest loans, subsidies and 
bonuses, thereby enhancing their ability to attract new members.4 Yet what happened 
before that is not clear. 
Part of the academic literature on cooperative wineries has tended to consider 
that they have played a very positive role since the early twentieth century.5 Another 
part, however, often written by wine economists, has considered that cooperative 
wineries have major difficulties in combating free-rider behaviour, which leads them to 
operate badly.6 Fernández and Simpson share the second view and claim that 
cooperatives were unable to control the quality of the raw material they received 
without incurring prohibitive costs, because they specialised in producing cheap wine 
and European grape was very heterogeneous in quality.7 As there was no control, those 
who joined a cooperative assumed that the other members would only contribute their 
 
1 Cogeca, Agricultural cooperatives. 
2 Fernández and Simpson, ‘Product quality’, p. 125. 
3 Own calculations based on Rouanet (Problème, p. 141) and Loubère (Wine, p. 139).  
4 Fernández and Simpson, ‘Product quality’. See also Planas and Medina-Albadalejo ‘Too little’; Planas 
and Medina-Albadalejo, ‘Bodegas’; Medina-Albadalejo, ‘Co-operative wineries’. 
5 For example, Gavignaud-Fontaine, ‘Les caves’; Rinaudo, ‘Coopérative’; Piqueras, ‘La vid’. 
6 Loubère The red; Loubère, Wine; Roudié, Vignes; Delmastro ‘An investigation’; Roma et al., ‘Wine 
labels’; Pennerstorfer and Weiss, ‘Product quality’; Schamel, ‘German wine’. 
7 Fernández and Simpson, ‘Product quality’. 
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worst grape and tended to do the same. Consequently, the wine was extremely poor 
quality and mutual distrust reigned among the members. This would be the reason why 
few cooperative wineries were created. 
The argument is appealing but leaves various questions unanswered.8 In 
southern France and Catalonia many cooperative wineries did appear.9 Substantial 
investment was required to build their facilities, which forced the members to go into 
debt. Why were people willing to get into debt to become members of a club of free-
riders? 
We now know that with a good system of rules and sanctions the Tragedy of the 
Commons can be prevented even in the commons.10 For centuries, with good rules, 
rudimentary techniques and much ingenuity, commoners in many places have 
effectively persecuted free-rider behaviour even among users of flowing water, a 
resource that was very complicated to measure until relatively recently.11 Why were 
cooperatives unable to do the same with grape quality, which is apparently easier to 
measure? 
Cooperatives are often created in response to information asymmetry 
problems,12 but they are created by the people adversely affected by the problem, 
whereas, if Fernández and Simpson are correct, in wine-growing the opposite occurred. 
In both table wine producing areas and fine wine producing regions (Champagne, 
Burgundy or Jerez), small farmers would often sell their grape so that others (merchants 
or better-off growers) could make wine with it.13 As those who had grown the grape had 
better information on any defects than those who purchased it, why were cooperatives 
often set up by farmers who wanted to stop selling grape on the market to then sell it to 
 
8 Although in the rest of the paper I will dissent from Fernández and Simpson's thesis, 'Product quality', 
regarding the period before the Second World War, I became interested in cooperative wineries thanks to 
their stimulating article. Their ideas convinced me and I wanted to gather information to test them. But I 
ended up coming to the conclusion that in the early twentieth century things had not gone exactly the way 
they claim. 
9 On southern France, see Congrès, XIV Congrès. The Catalan case is analysed in a companion article to 
this one: Garrido, ‘Inequality’. See also Planas, ‘Emergence’. 
10 Ostrom, Governing the commons. 
11 Garrido, ‘Water’. 
12 Hansmann, ‘Cooperative firms’. 
13 Mandeville, Étude, pp. 45-58; Planas, ‘Emergence’, p. 270; Bernácer, Comercio, p. 25; Piqueras, 
Campo Arcís; Guide, Associations, p. 141; Blic, Crise, p. 6; Torrejón, Bodegas, p. 14 
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the company that they co-owned?14 Meanwhile, merchants did not stop purchasing 
grape nor did they generally embark on backward integration processes,15 which 
suggests that measuring grape quality was not prohibitively expensive for them. So why 
was it for cooperatives? 
The rest of the article is organised as follows. Section 2 argues that, given the 
characteristics of the demand for wine, producing quality wine would have been a bad 
choice for most of the first cooperatives. Sections 3 and 4 reject the idea that members 
were trapped in a Prisoner’s Dilemma situation. Section 5 shows that, despite this, 
cooperative wineries were generally unable to offer their members substantial 
advantages over non-members. The final section contains the conclusions. 
 
2. Consumer preferences matter 
 
As the Danish cooperative dairies enjoyed spectacular success at an early stage of their 
development, it is practical to use them to perform a comparison with what happened in 
winegrowing. Good institutional design meant that in Denmark cooperatives became the 
most efficient way of organising butter production using automatic cream separators, 
which produced better butter than pre-existing technologies. In 1903 the owners of 81 
per cent of Danish cows were already members of a cooperative dairy.16 Presumably, 
the fact that in Great Britain, the main destination for Danish butter, consumers were 
willing to pay more for better quality was a major requirement for this to happen, 
because otherwise Danish butter would not have had more demand in the British market 
than the cheaper and poorer quality Irish butter and the Danes would have been less 
motivated to use the new technology and join cooperatives. 
However, Postel-Vinay and Robin showed that in mid-nineteenth century France 
the demand for wine had both high income elasticity and high price elasticity, so that 
expenditure on wine ‘increased rapidly’ when income improved, but ‘quickly retreated’ 
 
14 Sometimes cooperatives are only able to attract as members those who want to use them to offload the 
worst of their production (Garrido, ‘Plenty of trust’). But such adverse selection processes only occur 
when the barriers to entry are low. Cooperative wineries, whose members had to get into debt, had high 
barriers to entry. 
15 Simpson, Creating wine, p. 54. 
16 Henriksen et al., ‘Role of technology’. 
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when wine became more expensive.17 At the beginning of the twentieth century the 
increase in the level of income led to a rise in per capita consumption,18 but from the 
large amount of information gathered by Fernández and Simpson it can be seen that, 
throughout the whole of the Mediterranean area, the typical consumer of wine remained 
unwilling to pay more for better quality.19 In the late nineteenth century various 
scientific developments enabled winegrowers to know which controllable factors made 
the wine they produced drinkable, but the new ‘scientific viniculture’ did not serve to 
make the production of premium wine cheaper because of the need to use slow wine 
maturing processes. As a result, although in the early twentieth century frequent over-
production led to falls in the prices of table wine,20 the situation did not encourage the 
production of better quality wine because, as ‘consumers did not focus on the class of 
wine, but only on the cheap price of the product’,21 whoever produced quality wine 
would most probably have to sell it at the price of table wine in order to find a market 
for it.22 
Consequently, the immense majority of wine – on average, 97.9 per cent of that 
produced in France between 1907 and 1913 and 94.5 per cent of that produced in Spain 
between the years 1932 and 1935 – was table wine.23 Market preferences only began to 
change in the 1970s, first in France and then in the other countries, but by 1990 
consumption of wine of a higher quality than table wine continued to represent a scanty 
16 per cent of all the wine consumed in Spain and 38 per cent in France.24 
For this reason, and with few exceptions, the early cooperatives produced table 
wine. In fact, a Spanish study intended to promote their creation advised that they 
 
17 Postel-Vinay and Robin, ‘Eating’, p. 504. 
18 Pinilla and Ayuda, ‘Market dynamism’. 
19 Simpson, Creating wine, especially pp. 48 and 55; Fernández, ‘Especialización’. 
20 Pech, Entreprise; Pujol, ‘Crisis’; Pan-Montojo, Bodega; Simpson, Creating wine; Planas, ‘State 
intervention’; Fernández and Pinilla, ‘Spain’. 
21 Flamarique, ‘Cooperativas’, p. 11. 
22 For a detailed account of the difficulties faced by a large landowner in La Rioja (Spain) who decided to 
specialise in the production of premium wine, see González Inchaurraga, El marqués. Raventós, Verema, 
pp. 78-80, reports on a similar case that occurred in Catalonia. 
23 Ministère du Travail et de la Prévoyance Sociales, Annuaire Statistique de la France (1907-1915); 
Ministerio de Agricultura. Anuario estadístico de las producciones agrícolas (1932-1935). 
24 Fernández, ‘Especialización’, p. 48. 
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should only produce ‘good table wine that can be sold cheaply’.25  
 
3. The cooperatives were able to fight free-rider behaviour 
 
Anyone who intended to specialise in the production of quality wine had to be able to 
familiarise (the few) potential purchasers with the characteristics of their product. As 
that task was easier when wine came from areas famed for the quality of their wines, in 
France most cooperatives producing good wine were created (by former grape sellers) 
in Champagne and Burgundy.26 A few cooperatives that opted for quality also appeared 
in some towns in the south of the country whose wine already enjoyed certain 
prestige.27 In Spain, the same happened in Alella (Barcelona) and Peñafiel (Valladolid). 
They used to be exclusively made up of small farmers and many produced good wine 
with poor financial results, because they had difficulties in accessing the short-term 
credit required to finance the process of maturing the wine.28 
It is commonly supposed that the more numerous cooperatives producing table 
wine were doomed to be simply passive receivers of the larger or smaller amounts of 
grape of any quality that the members wanted to contribute. But it is not evident that 
this was the case for four reasons. Firstly, the typical member was a small or medium-
size winegrower. A large part of their total income came from their transactions with the 
cooperative, to which they knew they would be linked for long periods. They usually 
knew most of the other members personally and lived near them and the cooperative. In 
such circumstances, investing time in order to influence affairs at the cooperative 
becomes profitable for members.29 
Secondly, detecting whether grape quality was appropriate for producing a good 
table wine was not excessively expensive. Grape quality depends on sugar content (used 
to predict the alcohol content of the future wine), acidity, variety, maturity, colour and 
sanitary condition.30 Exact measurement of sugar and acidity must be performed with 
 
25 Torrejón, Bodegas, p. 21. 
26 Clique, Caves. 
27 Mandeville, Étude, pp. 113-34. 
28 Mandeville, Étude, pp. 124-30; Clique, Caves coopératives, pp. 154-63; Alella Vinícola, 
Cincuentenario. 
29 Hansmann, ‘Cooperative firms’. 
30 Robinson, Oxford companion, p. 335. 
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laboratory instruments, but the other parameters can be appreciated through the senses 
and offer an approximate idea of the sugar content and acidity, which are closely linked 
to grape variety and maturity.31 
Thirdly, there were many cheap measures that cooperatives could take to 
discourage opportunism. For example, they could visit the vines before the harvest to 
estimate the volume and quality of production. They could also not pay anything for 
very poor quality grape and use any revenue it provided to add a bonus to the price of 
the rest of the grape; in that way, most members would obtain a total income similar to 
that they would have obtained if all the grape had been paid for and nobody specialised 
in producing poor quality grape. Or, to prevent members from replacing low-yield high-
quality vine varieties with others of the opposite characteristics, they could pay a 
different price for each grape variety (or not accept certain grape varieties). 
Finally, all members were individually ‘imprisoned’ by the investment required 
to build a winery, thereby enabling the collective to escape the Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
Ingrid Henriksen and collaborators consider there were two basic factors for the success 
of cooperative dairies in Denmark and their relative failure in Ireland: in contrast to 
Ireland, the articles of association of Danish cooperatives clearly specified members’ 
obligations (including that of not abandoning the cooperative until the end of a given 
term, which was usually equal to the period for repaying the loan taken out to build the 
facility) and the Danish legal system ensured that those obligations were binding.32 
Members of cooperative wineries were also bound by rules and loans. 
Most French cooperative wineries (322 of the 353 existing in late 1927) were 
built with government loans, which were only granted on condition that all members 
were joint and severally liable for repaying them.33 In direct relation to this, the 
cooperatives’ articles of association usually obliged members to contribute all or part of 
their grape for 25 years or more. In the event of dispute, judges forced people leaving 
cooperatives to make considerable outlays34. In Spain, since 1906 the Ley de Sindicatos 
Agrícolas (1906 Agrarian Syndicates Act), the principal legislation on cooperation in 
Spanish law, stated that, regardless of what the articles of association specified, 
 
31 Badell, ‘Valoración’. 
32 Henriksen et al., ‘Law and peace’; Henriksen et al., ‘Contracts’. 
33 Tardy, ‘Coopération’, pp. 420 and 444. 
34 Gervais, Coopération, pp. 59-61; Mandeville, Étude, pp. 153-5; Chalmain, ‘Coopérateurs’. 
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members were free to leave whenever they wished, but were liable for all the 
obligations and liabilities they had contracted up until then. As a result, the articles of 
association of Spanish cooperatives limited themselves to indicating that members had 
to contribute their grape throughout the life of the loan. Consequently, when two 
cooperatives left a district federation which had built a distillery, with disastrous 
economic results, the judge made them pay a substantial amount to the federation.35 
Another cooperative brought a successful claim against 19 members who wanted to 
change to a rival cooperative.36 
Everyone was anxious to ensure that nobody totally or partially breached their 
obligation to contribute grape because, as in France and Italy,37 the harvest each 
member had undertaken to contribute determined what percentage of the shared loan he 
would have to repay. Repayments were made by the cooperative withholding a portion 
of the revenue generated by individual contributions of grape. The more grape the 
cooperative processed, the quicker the loan would be paid back; anyone who cheated on 
amounts would directly harm each of the other members. 
As the next sections will explain, all of the above facilitated governance of 
cooperative wineries – although most winegrowers preferred not to be subject to this 
type of discipline and did not join them. 
 
4. Less opportunism than people think 
 
Danish cooperative dairies required members to give up their entire milk production, 
but cooperative wineries often did not require members to contribute all their grape. In 
principle, if they had done so, it would have been easier to prevent members from 
cheating on quantity or quality. Some cooperatives in Champagne and Burgundy, 
however, only wanted to receive grape suitable for producing fine wine. So, members of 
Burgundy cooperatives had to hand over their entire harvest of pinot fin and none of the 
rest. Two types of fraud were therefore possible: they could keep part of the pinot fin or 
they could mix it with other varieties. But according to Hubert Clique fraudulent 
behaviour was exceptional ‘because members monitored each other, so it was difficult 
 
35 Planas and Vallès, ‘Espluga’. 
36 Santesmases, Cooperativisme, pp. 100-3. 
37 Clique, Caves. 
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for one member to cheat without another member finding out’.38 This mutual 
surveillance was not exclusive to cooperatives producing fine wine.39 
There were two main reasons why many table-wine making cooperatives did not 
require all the grape. In southern France it was partly due to the fact that the vines 
destroyed by the phylloxera plague in the late nineteenth century were replanted with 
very high yielding varieties and so many farmers no longer had the capacity to store all 
their harvest. The cooperatives were intended to extend rather than replace private 
wineries so that members did not have to sell grape or must instead of wine.40 In other 
places (and partly in southern France as well) cooperatives adopted this policy to 
attempt to attract well-off winegrowers, who usually flatly refused to become members 
if they had to contribute all their grape. Cooperatives were interested in attracting such 
winegrowers because their presence made it easier to access economies of scale.41 And, 
above all, they made it easier to obtain loans. In France, this was because government 
loans to cooperatives (at 2 or 3 per cent) were intended to supplement the capital that 
members of cooperatives achieved through other means – they could be between one 
and a half and two times the amount of that capital.42 In Spain, it was due to the fact that 
banks only loaned to cooperatives (at 5 or 6 per cent) if the membership included very 
solvent individuals.43 
Spanish table-wine making cooperatives that did not require their members’ 
entire harvests used four procedures to regulate the issue.44 In some (only a few) 
cooperatives, members had to contribute a given fraction of their total harvest. In others 
(also only a few) members had to contribute all the harvest from a given number of 
clearly identified vines. As a third option, members undertook to deliver a fixed volume 
of grape. That option, as in southern France and Italy,45 was the most widely used 
system, because it was a way of ensuring that the cooperative facilities worked almost 
 
38 Clique, Caves, p. 59. 
39 Marsais, Caves, gives examples. 
40 Gervais, Coopération; Mandeville, Étude. 
41 See Congrés, XIV Congrès, p. 352, on Algeria. 
42 Tardy, ‘Coopération’, p. 428. 
43 Garrido, Treballar. 
44 The statements that follow are based on a reading of numerous cooperative regulations and the 
literature cited in footnote 45. 
45 Clique, Caves. 
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every year at full capacity and made it difficult for members to cheat on the amount of 
grape delivered. The fourth procedure was used by some Catalonian cooperatives, 
which allowed members to keep grape on farms located at more than a certain distance 
from its facilities (or on farms that had a winery).46 
Although it has generally been assumed that such regulations did not serve to 
effectively combat opportunist behaviours, in Spain numerous local studies have used 
the documentation generated by cooperative wineries and none have provided evidence 
that opportunism was widespread or raised very serious problems.47 Naturally, every so 
often someone was found to have breached the rules, but cooperatives managed to 
prevent, often through very substantial fines and expulsions,48 such actions from 
triggering a cascade of breaches, which is what usually happens when collective action 
institutions are unable to punish offenders adequately.49 Those who were expelled 
usually lost all their rights and had to make annual payments to the cooperative until the 




Figure 1 illustrates that such rigour was effective. We know how much grape the 
two Catalonian cooperatives shown in the figure received over time from a group of 
members known to own vines worked by sharecroppers, from a group of members 
known to be sharecroppers, and from the other members (including, although we do not 
know in what proportion, landlords, sharecroppers and small and medium-size owners). 
The temptation to take little grape to the cooperative in years when the market paid a lot 
 
46 Catalonian vines that were far away from cooperatives were usually on mountainous slopes and 
cultivated by sharecroppers. Many landlords had a winery on that type of farm, whereas sharecroppers 
had their wineries in the village (or had no wineries). See Garrido, ‘Sharecropping’. 
47 Puig, Celler; Martos, ‘Sindicato’; Fuguet, ‘Celler’; Gavaldà, Associacionisme; Gavaldà and 
Santesmases, Història; Fuguet and Mayayo, Primer celler; Soto, Bodega; Santesmases, Cooperativisme; 
Teixidó, Societat; Saumell, Crisi; Saumell, Viticultura; Saumell, Cooperativa; Ibarra, ‘Sindicat’; 
Muntadas, Alella Vinícola; Cárdaba and Musquera, Celler; Llorca , ‘Cooperació’, Mayayo, Empemta; 
Ferrer Alós, ‘Sindicat’; Pena, Breu història; Piqueras, Campo Arcís; Planas, Viticultura; Planas, 
‘Características’; Audí, 100 anys; Vallès, Celler; Muruzabal, Centenario; Planas and Vallès, ‘Espluga’; 
García, Bullas. 
48 Saumell, Cooperativa; Planas, Viticultura; Audí, 100 anys. 
49 Ostrom, Governing the commons. 
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for it, and vice-versa, was there for everyone. But engaging in such behaviour without 
being discovered was easier for landlords than for sharecroppers, who almost always 
cultivated small plots that gave small harvests, and so cheating on modest amounts 
represented high percentages of the harvest. Therefore, if cheating on amounts had been 
as frequent as the literature supposes, the cheats would have been mainly the landlords 
and the evolution of the three series would have been different. According to the non-
parametric tests, however, there are no significant differences among the three series, 
and so the variations in grape delivery must have been basically caused by inter-annual 
variations in the volume harvested due to factors beyond the farmer’s control.50 
Furthermore, it is not clear that giving the worst grape to the cooperative was 
always beneficial because most cooperatives paid by kilograms of grape received taking 
the sugar content into account, which served to penalise those who delivered grape 
which produced little alcohol. This was the most interesting parameter to monitor 
because when negotiating the price of table wine merchants focussed on the alcohol 
content.51 Small farmers’ vines were usually on hillsides, producing low yields and 
wine with a very high alcohol content, whereas vines on the plains, which gave high 
yields and low alcohol content, usually belonged to well-off people. If the cooperatives 
had simply paid for grape by weight, small farmers would not have wanted to join.52 
Control over the other attributes of the grape was much looser, because the 
 
50 The available data on the Marsillargues cooperative (southern France) suggest the same. We know how 
many hectolitres of wine were produced between 1913 and 1925 (Congrès, XIV Congrès, p. 168). After 
transforming the series to index numbers (1913-1925 = 100) and performing the same operation with the 
hectolitres produced in southern France in the same period (Pech, Entreprise, pp. 497-8), a Mann-
Whitney test  indicates that the null hypothesis that the distributions of both series are identical cannot be 
rejected (p = 0.42). 
51 Mandeville, Étude, p. 29; Riba, Cellers, p. 14; Cañizo, Bodegas, p. 8; Badell, ‘Valoración’, p. 228. 
52 Although cooperatives in the Var and Hérault departments (southern France) and the Priorat district 
(Catalonia) did not measure alcohol content (Mandeville, Étude, pp. 165-8; Badell, ‘Valoración’, p. 220), 
in the Var this was partially compensated by the fact that cooperatives paid different prices for each grape 
variety. In Hérault almost all the grape came from the plains and had a low alcohol content. And in the 
Priorat almost all the grape came from slopes and was high in sugar. For this reason, the general assembly 
of a Priorat cooperative prohibited members from grafting their vines with varieties that were not 
traditional in the area. At the same cooperative, when a member reported that some vineyards were being 
pruned using a technique that would increase the harvest at the expense of the sugar content, a committee 
inspected all the vines and imposed heavy fines on the opportunists (Audí, 100 anys, pp. 184-5). 
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majority of members decided to allow behaviours that did not coincide with best 
possible practices. According to the manager of one cooperative, gaining quality by 
strictly monitoring variables that were not alcohol content made the product more 
expensive and difficult to sell.53 For years another cooperative employed an engineer 
with great powers to prescribe phytosanitary treatments for vines, organise the harvest 
and reject grape that was not in perfect condition. He was dismissed in 1915 because the 
members considered that the increases in the selling prices thus achieved were not 
sufficient to cover his salary.54 For similar reasons, although the articles of association 
of almost all cooperatives said that unripe grape would be rejected, the members of 
some cooperatives decided it should be accepted.55 But the detriments it caused to the 
cooperative were not paid for by all the members but only by those who contributed 
unripe grape, because unripe grape has less sugar than ripe grape and grape was paid for 
according to its sugar content. 
In any event, laxity did not mean the absence of rules, because cooperatives set 
limits on what would be tolerated and if those limits were exceeded they would 
intervene. Merchants who bought grape to make table wine more than likely behaved in 
the same way. A French company purchased large amounts of grape from the Priorat 
district, made wine in rented wineries and sent it to France. When the first cooperatives 
appeared in the Priorat, the company stopped buying grape and started purchasing their 
wine.56 For the purpose of the argument in this article, the quality of cooperative wine in 
absolute terms did not matter. But it did have to be at least of a similar quality to the 
wine the company had been producing, which would have been impossible to achieve if 
the cooperatives had been unable to control the quality of the grape at least as 
effectively as the company. 
 
5. Why then were there so few cooperative wineries? 
 
If, like Danish dairies, cooperatives have a very high market share, ‘private’ marketing 
networks become smaller and farmers who are not members find it difficult to sell their 
 
53 Flamarique, ‘Cooperativas’. 
54 Saumell, Crisi, p. 380 
55 Campllonch, CellerS, p. 85 
56 Audí, 100 anys. 
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production and tend to join a cooperative. Before the Second World War, cooperative 
wineries were a long way from reaching the critical point required for a virtuous circle 
of this type to make itself felt. As the major winegrowers kept largely outside the 
cooperative movement,57 the ‘private’ marketing networks continued to have a major 
presence and any small winegrower could continue to use them. The cooperatives 
themselves thought that selling directly to consumers forced them to assume too many 
risks and so (contrary to the myth) they did not try to make the intermediaries disappear 
and sold their wine to merchants. 
According to their propagandists, cooperative wineries offered three main 
advantages. Firstly, their mechanical presses enabled members to obtain between 6 and 
11 per cent more wine per kilogram of grape than small farmers who used manual 
presses. Unfortunately for the cooperatives, purchasing mechanical presses individually 
was perfectly within the capabilities of wealthy winegrowers. Furthermore, the greater 
gains in productivity in the range indicated above could only be obtained using 
continuous mechanical presses, which simultaneously generated three qualities of must, 
the worst of which only served to produce cloudy, unpleasant wine.58 
If winegrowers stored wine in their private wineries hoping prices would rise, 
they risked having to sell it at any price immediately before the next harvest in order to 
make room for the new crop. In theory, the second advantage of cooperatives was that 
they could store wine for more than a year. That is effectively what happened from the 
1950s on, but previously that advantage was another myth. The technical advances 
introduced by ‘scientific viniculture’ made stored wine much less likely to go bad at the 
beginning of the twentieth century than had been the case forty years before. And the 
wine produced by the cooperatives (which used to rely on technicians to direct the 
winemaking process, applied relatively stringent hygiene measures, etc.) was less likely 
to spoil than the wine previously produced individually by their members. But even so, 
 
57 See Riba, Cellers, p. 19, or the quote Simpson, ‘Cooperation’, p. 123, provides from Guide, Les 
associations, p. 138. European cooperative wineries were only able to attract as members a large number 
of well-off winegrowers during the period following the Second World War (Loubère, Wine); Medina-
Albadalejo, ‘Cooperativismo’, and Piqueras, Campo Arcís, provide good examples of this. 
58 Campllonch, Cellers, pp. 146-54. These were the presses used by the majority of Catalonian 
cooperative wineries, which according to an expert had chosen well ‘because to produce wines that are 
competitive, without the buyer paying one peseta more for the best quality, the important thing is to 
obtain the highest possible yield’ (Torrejón, Bodegas, p. 81). 
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the probability that wine stored for more than a year would go bad continued to be high, 
‘which means that,’ wrote a technician in 1923, ‘nobody wants to keep wine, except 
when it comes to wines destined to be matured and bottled, beyond the new harvest.’59 
Moreover, having tanks that were enormously large in relation to the processed crop 
would have meant more construction costs, bigger loans and an increase in unit 
production costs. Consequently, few cooperatives had such tanks and most had to sell 
the wine before the next harvest.60  
The third advantage stemmed from the supposed negotiating power that selling 
large quantities of wine gave to the cooperatives. In fact, during the many times of 
overproduction selling large amounts was more of an inconvenience than anything else. 
At such times, cooperatives temporarily withdrew fairly large volumes of wine from the 
local markets, to the benefit of growers who were not members. For that reason, during 
difficult years the members of many cooperatives requested permission to sell the wine 
that corresponded to them individually. To reduce risk, some Catalonian cooperatives 
sold their wine to a very small number of merchants and sometimes sold their entire 
production for several years to a single merchant.61 In exchange for the certainty they 
would sell the wine, they were prepared to drop the price. In southern France, where 
cooperatives claimed to provide winegrowers with a ‘standard price’ which was 
‘sufficiently remunerative’,62 something similar must have happened. 
It can therefore be assumed that if in the early twentieth century few cooperative 
wineries were created it was mainly because the prices members received for the wine 
were not clearly higher than the prices obtained by non-members. But they could not be 
much lower either, because new cooperative wineries were continually being created 
and very few cooperative wineries disappeared once the loan to build the facilities had 
been paid back in full. Finding data series to verify these hypotheses is difficult, but the 
data from the table-wine making cooperatives shown in Figure 2 seem to confirm them. 
 
 
59 Bernácer, Comercio, p. 7. 
60 In 1928, Italian cooperative wineries were able to store 1,200,000 hl and they produced 1,000,000 hl – 
2 per cent of all Italian wine (Clique, Caves, p. 253). According to Marsais (Caves, p. 49), by 1930 a 
typical French cooperative had a capacity of 10,000 hl and on average produced 8,000 hl. 
61 Saumell, Crisi; Gavaldà and Santesmases, Història; Planas, Viticultura, pp. 246-7; Audí, 100 anys. 




All the cooperatives in Figure 2 produced table wine except for the Alella 
cooperative, which sold its quality wine at relatively very high net prices. In spite of 
this, its members were dissatisfied for a long time. As it aged the wine for at least three 
years, the harvest was paid for with a three-year delay – and sometimes even later, 
because income from sales had to be used to cover operating costs. The situation only 
changed around 1930, when the prestige that the cooperative had been earning over a 
quarter of a century enabled the volume of wine sold and its prices to grow.63 
All the cooperatives in Figure 2 are from Catalonia except the one in San Martín 
de Unx (Navarre). Prices of the Catalonian table-wine making cooperatives are 
presented in three series (the average price at which the six cooperatives sold their wine, 
the price at which the Ripollet cooperative sold it and the price at which the Llorenç 
cooperative sold it) because of suspicions that the Ripollet and Llorenç prices represent 
only part of the sales made. But when a Kruskall-Wallis test was used to check whether 
there was any statistical evidence that the series of wine prices in Catalonia, the average 
prices of the six cooperatives and the average prices of the eight cooperatives (that is to 
say, the six cooperatives plus Ripollet and Llorenç) were different, the results were 
negative (p = 0.94). What happened in the Marsillargues cooperative, one of the most 
powerful in France, points in the same direction as such series: between 1911 and 1925 
the Marsillargues cooperative sold its wine for an average of 57.3 francs (current prices) 
per hectolitre and the average regional price was 59.2 francs,64 but a Mann-Whitney test 
shows that cooperative prices and ‘market prices’ did not differ significantly (p = 0.73). 
It is true that, even though the selling prices of wine were similar, thanks to the 
cooperative the small winegrower members could obtain a little more wine from their 
grapes than they would have achieved in their wineries using traditional presses. But in 
return, until the loan to build the facilities was paid off, the cooperative retained a 
portion of the wine they were entitled to every year. And to be members they had to 
accept joint and several liability for the loan and therefore they had to run the risk that, 
due to malfunctioning or any other circumstance, the cooperative would disappear 
before the loan was paid off – something that rarely happened, but did sometimes occur. 
 
63 Alella Vinícola, Cincuentenario. 
64 Congrès, XIV Congrès, p. 168; Pech, Entreprise, pp. 512-3. 
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Although joining a cooperative winery was not the same as joining a free-rider 
club, most winegrowers must have simply thought that the disadvantages of joining 
them outweighed any benefits that could be gained. In consequence, the first 




Since cooperatives began to receive large subsidies in the 1950s to produce whatever 
type of wine they wanted, they had the perverse stimuli required to be totally 
unconcerned about the quality of their wine and they could even afford to be 'inefficient 
firms'.65 The literature on wine has projected that image to the past and assumed that it 
was happening from the moment the very first cooperative wineries were created. This 
article has defended a very different view. 
This article has argued that the first cooperative wineries were perfectly able to 
control the quality of the grape they received. The fact that, with few exceptions, they 
produced table wine was simply because that was the type of product most consumers 
wanted. But there were many different prices of table wine and the cooperatives 
generally managed to impose on their members the necessary discipline to achieve the 
type of table wine they were interested in producing. They did not, however, manage to 
offer the winegrower, and large-scale winegrowers in particular, sufficiently attractive 
services to compensate for the disadvantages of being a member. In turn, the absence of 
well-off winegrowers among the members hindered access to credit and economies of 
scale for the cooperatives, made it easier for the ‘private’ wine trade to continue to have 
a hegemonic presence and made cooperatives less attractive for all winegrowers. 
According to a manual for cooperative members in the early 1920s, ‘The 
demands and convenience of the consumer market must be met first of all. If current 
circumstances change [...] we would need to think about replacing procedures that 
sacrifice quality in order to obtain quantity’.66 In the late twentieth century 
 
65 According to Medina-Albadalejo, ‘Co-operative wineries’, around 1970 the ease with which Spanish 
cooperative wineries could access state-subsidised loans allowed them to be able to offer their members 
very attractive services and, at the same time, they were ‘inefficient firms’, due to their excessive 
indebtedness – something that obviously mattered very little to their members. 
66 Torrejón, Bodegas, p. 82. 
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circumstances did indeed change. First, table wine was losing its appeal for consumers 
and demand dropped. Then European authorities began modifying their subsidy policies 
and cooperatives were forced to change. Although change is not always easy, because 
the members of many cooperatives are mainly elderly farmers or part-time farmers who 
would prefer everything to stay the same, it has often been accomplished successfully.67 
In fact, the number of cooperatives producing quality wines, and even top quality wines, 
is increasing. But their labels do not usually indicate that the wines come from 
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Figure 1 Grape contributed by members of two cooperative wineries (index numbers). 
Sources: Author’s elaboration with Saumell’s, Crisi, data. On Les Cabanyes there is 
information for 13 years in the period 1920-1935; on Moja, for 1924-1935. In Les 
Cabanyes members had to deliver all the grape from their vineyards located at less than 





Figure 2. Price of the wine sold by various Spanish cooperative wineries. Sources: 
Catalonia: Colomé et al., ‘Les cycles’; Alella: Alella Vinícola, Cincuentenario; San 
Martín de Unx: Muruzabal, Centenario; average 6 cooperatives: Cabanyes, Banyeres, 
Moja and Vendrell (Saumell, Crisi), Espluga de Francolí (Vallès, Celler), and Vila-
rodona (Santesmases, Cooperativisme); Ripollet: Martos, ‘Sindicato’. Llorenç: Saumell, 
Cooperativa. Author’s elaboration. 
 
 
 
